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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the court's invasion of the contract. 4  The right of the court under
Section 17 seems to be based on inherent equity powers to regulate
trusts, and this power.is expressly forbidden to be exercised as against
such accumulations in policies of insurance. 5
F.G.
WAR-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-Plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant, the Alien Property Custodian under Section 9a of
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended,1 to recover
its property that was seized and was being liquidated by the defendant.
Plaintiff made a motion for an order directing defendant to retain
in his custody until final judgment the property seized and to permit
the plaintiff to carry on its business. The defendant countered with
a motion to dismiss the entire complaint on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction over this seizure andthat the defendant
has determined that the plaintiff corporation and its president were
nationals of a designated enemy country and cloaking for German
interests in Germany and that the interests of the United States
require the liquidation of the corporation. Held, motion to dismiss
the complaint denied. The court has jurisdiction over all seizures
under the Trading With the Enemy Act so long as the plaintiff
is not an "enemy" or "ally of enemy" within the meaning of those
terms in the Act.2 Defendant shall not liquidate the corporation or
sell the stock until it is deqided whether the plaintiffs are "nationals
of a designated enemy country." Draeger Shipping Co. Inc. et al. v.
Crowley, Alien Property Custodian, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
4 Pierowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 118, 275 N. W. 789
(1937).5 In re Howland, 37 Misc. 114, 74 N. Y. Supp. 950 (1902),rev'd on other
grounds, 75 App. Div. 207, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1902); Matter of Muller,
29 Hun 418 (N. Y. 1883); Matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375 (N. Y. 1847);
Matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 100 (N. Y. 1819).
See N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.
140 STAT. 411, 50 U. S. C. A. App. (1917).
2 40 STAT. 411, § 9 (1917), permits suit to review seizure by the Alien
Property Custodian but does not allow one who is an enemy or ally of an enemy
to bring suit. Id. § 2, defines an enemy as: "(a) Any individual, partnership, or
other body of individuals of any nationality, resident within the territory (includ-
ing that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the
United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business
within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of
any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any
country other than the United States and doing business within such territory."
The phrase "ally of enemy" has a similar definition with reference: to nations
which are allies of nations with which the United States is at war.
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RECENT DECISIONS
During World War I the Alien Property Custodian was created
by Section 6 of the Trading With the Enemy Act and that office
proceeded to act thereunder. Now, during our contemporary com-
plex carnage, the Alien Property Custodian derives its authority
from Section 5(b) of the Act, as amended by Title III, Section 301
of the First War Powers Act of 1941 3 which gives the President
broad powers during this national emergency over any property
within United States jurisdiction in which a foreign country or
national thereof has any interest. It also authorizes him to delegate
these broad powers to any agency. Pursuant thereto, the President
in Exec. Ord. No. 9095, as amended by Exec. Ord. No. 9193 4 set
up the Office of the Alien Property Custodian and delegated to it
the power to "direct, manage, supervise, control or vest" business
enterprises which were nationals of a designated enemy or foreign
country, and any property which is owned or controlled by foreign
or enemy countries or their nationals.5 Thus all the present powers
of the Custodian stem from Section 5(b), as amended, whereas the
former Alien Property Custodian got his powers from the various
sections of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, Section 7(c)
among others. Section 9 provides administrative and judicial relief
for anyone not an enemy or an ally of an enemy whose property was
seized by the Custodian. In view of this difference in the derivation
of powers, the defendant Custodian in the principal case argued that
the relief permitted under Section 9(a) of the Act applied only to
seizures under 7(c) and not to seizures of property of a foreign
"national" under Section 5 (b) as amended by the First War Powers
Act of 1941, which, he claimed, was a separate and distinct statute.
The Custodian also argued that the plaintiff had not exhausted his
administrative remedies available under Section 5(b).
The defendant's contentions were overruled by the court because
it thought that it was the intention of Congress, by not making Title
III of the First War Powers Act of 1941 a separate act, but rather
an amendment to Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act,
that it intended it and the orders thereunder to be governed by the
other provisions in the Trading With the Enemy Act. The court
also thought that without the judicial remedies provided in Section
9(a), the 1941 Amendment would be unconstitutional because it
itself does not provide for any 'remedy for the return of property
erroneously seized. The court said, "If construed as unaffected by
Section 9(a) it would depend upon the will of the President or
355 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 616 et seq.
47 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942), 1 CCH WAR LAW
(Stat.) 7001.
5 Exw-. ORD. No. 9095, as amended S. 10, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), 7 FED.
REG. 5205 (1942), and ExEc. ORD. No. 8389, § 5, as amended, 5 FED. REG. 1400,
1 CCH WAR LAW (Stat.) 14,011, contain the various definitions which go to
make up the concept of a national of a designated enemy country or of a
foreign country.
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.his representative whether there should be even an administrative
remedy, and if so, what it shall be." 6 Arbitrary sdizure by an admin-
istrative agency even if under war's exigencies must be subject to
judicial remedies, 7 otherwise such seizures would be unconstitutional
as depriving one of property without due process of law.
This decision is another indication that the courts will not wholly
forget the Constitution because of the war but will give a claimant
who is not an enemy or an ally of an enemy a hearing. The Alien
Property Custodian also finds himself bound by provisions of the
Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, as well as by
the very broad and loosely worded provisions of Exec. Ords. Nos.
9095 and 9193.8 However, the plaintiff must still overcome the
administrative determination that it is a national of a designated
enemy country and that the interest of the United States requires
the liquidation of the corporation. The effect of this decision is
that any claimant who finds himself within the scope of the new
executive definitions of "national of a designated enemy or foreign
country" but without the scope of the statutory definition of "enemy"
or "ally of enemy" may bring suit to review seizure by the Alien
Property Custodian. The principal case does not decide how far
the court will go in reviewing the administrative finding or what its
interpretations are of the aforementioned executive definitions.
L.Y.
6 Draeger Shipping Co., Inc. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
7 Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. 293, 65 L. ed. 604 (1921);
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 41 Sup. Ct. 214, 65 L'ed.
403 (1921), aff'g, Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265 Fed. 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
8 7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942), 1 CCH WAR LAW
(Stat.) 7001.
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